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31. Executive Summary
The empowerment of the poor through cell phones is this paper’s central theme. There already 
exist a number of cases in the world where such empowerment has already occurred in the 
financial sector through the usage of cell phones: the cases provided throughout the paper are 
Kenya, the Philippines and South Africa. There exist many reasons why it is imperative to 
facilitate access to the financial system for the entire pyramid of the population. To achieve 
financial inclusion in the remittances industry, the authors suggest an M-banking like solution for 
remittances transfer. M-banking offers the advantage of having a very low cost structure –
making it lucrative for banks to target the rural poor. 
Poverty is an insidious problem in Mexico. A large share of the population has to live on less than 
US$2 a day. In rural areas, and particularly in the Southern states, the issue is even more pressing. 
High levels of poverty lead to high rates of migration towards the North. Augmented migration in 
turn results in remittances inflows, which have reached unprecedented levels in Mexico with 
about US24bn in 2006. But immigrants have not fully capitalized their remittances because they 
are outside the banking system and pay high costs of transfers. New and cheap channels for 
transferal are available, but only for the banked. In Mexico between 20 or 30 percent of the 
population do have a bank account. However, cell phone penetration is about 45 percent – about 
twice as high as the level of bank account ownership. Consequently, given cell phones’ increased 
processing power and the high penetration rates of cell phones, they are the obvious means to 
have people take part in the financial sector.
We show in our econometric study that remittances promote savings accounts, but at the same 
time have an ambiguous effect on them through increased cell phone penetration. By creating 
virtual mobile bank accounts, banks can leverage the relatively high cell phone penetration across 
the income pyramid, to bank Mexico’s population – while benefiting from additional profitable 
business. Given remittances’ savings increasing nature, starting with remittances’ recipients is the 
logical and most powerful tipping point of the process.  
Our study finds that banks ignore the potential of the mobile banking market, including 
remittances transfers over cell phones. We suggest a number of policies to be implemented to 
enable the prospering of the mobile financial industry. 
42. Glossary
ABM  Asociación de Bancos de México (Association of Mexican 
Banks) 
BANCOMEXT Banco Nacional del Comercio Exterior (Nacional bank of 
foreign commerce; a Mexican development bank)
BANXICO Banco de México (Central Bank of Mexico)
AML Anti-Money Laundering Law
BANSEFI Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros (National 
Bank of Savings and Financial Services; a national 
development bank)
BOP Bottom-of-the-Pyramid
CFT Counter the Financing of Terror Regulation
CNBV Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (National Banking 
and Securities Commission)
COFETEL Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones (Federal 
Commission of Telecommunications)
CONAPO Consejo Nacional de la Población (National Council of 
Population)
CRA Community Reinvestment Act
Crowding-Out Effect Fall in private investment as a consequence of increased 
interest rates caused by higher public borrowing
FedACH Automated Clearing House used by the Fed and Banxico to 
facilitate remittance sending at very low cost
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
ICT Information and Communication Technology
INEGI Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática
(National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics)
M-banking Mobile Banking: Banking facilitated through cell phones
MFI Micro Finance Institutions 
MTO Money Transfer Operator
MVNO Mobile Virtual Network Operators (Network operators that do 
not have their own telecommunications infrastructure, but us 
the one of existing providers and reimburses them for the 
usage)
NAFINSA Nacional Financiera (a Mexican development bank)
ODA Official Development Assistance
POS Point-of-Sale
SME Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
SMS Short Message Service
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
53. Introduction
Why is financial inclusion so important? There exist many reasons why it is imperative to 
facilitate access to the financial system for the entire pyramid of the population. Having 
funds in a bank as compared to at home protects customers of theft while interest is 
accrued. Credit facilities allow poor customers to smooth consumption in bad times. 
People who do not have bank accounts tend to be charged significantly higher rates for a 
similar service (e.g. check cashing businesses or pay-day lenders in the US). The crucial 
detail is that the poor, who by definition have very little resources, are the ones who are 
being charged the highest fees. They appreciate an additional unit of a currency the most, 
as it has the largest impact on their overall standard of living. As Caskey et al (2004: 22) 
put it thus: “households that must borrow in the alternative financial sector because of 
impaired credit histories or heavy debt burdens, pay a substantial penalty for their status. 
When these are lower income households who already struggle economically, this 
compounds their problems.”
With respect to remittances the same point is valid. Bank of America and Citigroup offer 
remittance sending to Mexico at no charge for instance.1 However, this service is only 
available to the banked – at the sending and receiving end people need to have bank 
accounts. As getting a bank account is rather difficult in the US (illegal immigrants often 
do not meet the identification or minimum income requirements of banks) as well as
expensive in Mexico, using such services is hardly an option for the poor. Furthermore, 
having lived through numerous financial crises trust in banks is low. Consequently, large 
parts of the population are forced to use expensive money transmitters such as Western 
Union or MoneyGram. This paper looks into alternative ways – particularly using 
technology – how the poor can be integrated into the financial system. More specifically, 
we evaluate the feasibility and advantages of using M-banking alike technologies for 
remittances sending. 
                                                
1 Even a competitive exchange rate is provided
64. Poverty and Migration in Rural Mexico
Poverty is an insidious problem in Mexico. A large share of the population has to live on 
less than US$2 a day. In rural areas, and particularly in the Southern states, the issue is 
even more pressing. High levels of poverty lead to high rates of migration towards the 
North. This section shall elaborate on the poverty issue in Mexico and then discuss the 
migration characteristics and patterns of the country. 
a. Poverty in Mexico
Since its colonial origins and later 
independence from Spain in 1821, Mexico 
has not been able to effectively reduce 
poverty among its population. The battle 
has been constant but the obstacles for the 
country have been significant. Examining 
a sample of the recent macroeconomic 
history of the last two decades of the 20th 
century provides lucid examples of the 
problems that the country has faced. In the 
early 1980’s Mexico was recuperating 
from the first devaluation in 22 years. 
During that decade and the 90’s it faced 
three inflationary crises and continuous 
devaluations eventually resulting in the 1994 crisis. 
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Figure 1: Poverty ratios in Mexico, Source World 
Bank, WDI Online
7Like in many other countries, the poor 
in Mexico have always been the ones 
that face the consequences of any 
economic downturn the hardest. Figure 
1 shows that Mexico was able to make 
advances with regard to the people 
who live on less than a dollar a day –
measured at PPP this percentage was 
decreased from 16 percent in 1992 to 4 
percent of the population in 2002. The 
principal reasons for the substantial 
decrease in extreme poverty are thus: firstly, the anti-poverty program Oportunidades
that supports about five million families or a quarter of the population; and secondly, the 
increased tendency to move North – either to immigrate to the United States or to work in 
a richer state close to the Mexican border – and to send home remittances (The 
Economist 2006). With respect to the 2 dollar a day ratio there has hardly been any 
advancement during the same period. However, poverty in Mexico is not equally 
distributed in its territory.
The poor are concentrated mainly in 
the south of the country. As the current 
president, Mr. Calderón, puts it: “There 
is one Mexico more like North 
America and another Mexico more like
Central America … It is a very clear
challenge for me to make them more 
alike.”2 Figure 2 illustrates the 
concentration of poverty in the South. 
According to official figures every 
second Mexican suffers from some 
                                                
2 ibidem
Figure 2: Geography of Poverty in Mexico, Source: 
World Bank Poverty Assessment 2004. 
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Figure 3: Poverty and Urbanity. Source: World Bank 
WDI Online.
8degree of poverty. In the South this number is even higher; there this measure is three out 
of four. About twice as many people live in rural areas in the South than in the North; 
twice as many people do not have access to electricity as well as clean, piped water and 
illiteracy is twice as high.3
Poverty levels differ not only with geography, but also in terms of urbanity. People living 
in rural areas are substantially more likely to be poor than people living in cities. Rural 
poverty remains much higher than urban poverty – even though both showed a reduced 
trend. In 2002, 35 percent of the rural population was poor, compared to only 11 percent 
in urban areas. See figure 3 for an illustration.
b. Migration in Mexico
Not surprisingly, the migration 
level in the poorer, Southern states 
is the highest in the nation. Figure 
4 illustrates the relationship 
between urbanity, i.e. the 
percentage of people living in rural 
versus urban areas, and the 
probability to migrate. It is quite 
startling that there exists a 
relationship as depicted in the 
figure. States that have between 33
percent and 39 percent of their 
population in rural areas4 have the 
highest probability of migration. 
The five states that have the 
highest probability of migration
are Guanajuato, Nayarit, Durango, Michoacán, and Zacatecas. All of them, except for 
Zacatecas fall into the aforementioned range of rural population. Zacatecas, an “outlier” 
                                                
3 ibidem
4 As rural areas count villages with less than 2,500 inhabitants (as adopted by INEGI)
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has even a higher percentage of its population living in rural areas, which makes it the 
fourth most rural state in the country. Naturally, the probability to migrate and the 
percentage of people receiving remittances are highly correlated. The 5 states also have 
the highest share of households receiving remittances in the country. Zacatecas has the 
highest share of households receiving remittances, namely 13 percent of all households 
living in the state.5 At the other end of the spectrum are states like Baja California Sur, 
Campeche, Quintana Roo, Chiapas and Tabasco (in the order of decreasing share of 
families receiving remittances). Tabasco, the state that has least households receiving 
remittances, has a share of only 0.58 percent of all households getting remittances.
Chiapas, a highly rural state with 54.5 percent of its population living in settlements that 
are smaller than 2,500 people, is a bit of a puzzle. It hardly sends migrants towards the
North even though poverty is wide spread and urbanity is low. We explain this 
phenomenon with language barriers: many people living in Chiapas do not speak Spanish 
but an indigenous language and hence, encounter significant problems when trying to 
work in a Northern state of Mexico or the United States. 
5. Remittances
Remittances inflows have been globally increasing in amount and importance – Mexico
is not an exception. But immigrants have not fully capitalized their remittances because 
they are outside the banking system and pay high costs of transfers. Financial authorities 
have provided new and cheaper channels, but only for the banked, with such a large 
market the challenge remains in the 
unbanked. 
a. Global Transfers and 
Trends
In recent years, remittances flows from 
industrialized to developing countries 
have been rising and became a very 
important source of income for many 
                                                
5 CONAPO estimates based on a 10% simple of the XII Censo General de Población y Vivienda 2000
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countries. See figures 5. In an increasing 
number of cases remittances’ flows have 
surpassed the amounts of foreign direct 
investment and some other of the most 
important components of the balance of 
payments. 
Figure 6 shows the Mexican case. It can 
be noticed that remittances inflows have 
surpassed foreign direct investment and 
tourism and are just below the level of
oil exports, which have benefited 
lately from increased oil prices and 
have been traditionally the most 
important sources of foreign currency.
At a household level, remittances have 
increased in importance as well. 
Remittances represented 1.3 percent of 
the poor’s income in 1992. By 2002 
the share increased to 3.8 percent. For 
non-poor households the respective 
shares were 3 percent in 1992 and 6.2
percent in 2002. See Table 1 (World 
Bank 2004b: 224).
With the market for remittances 
evolving the sending methods have 
changed as well. The population has 
changed its preference of sending 
through informal to formal channels. 
Figure 7 depicts how cash transfers have 
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Figure 6: US-Mexico Remittances in Millions of US 
Dollars, Source: Central Bank of Mexico.
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1992 2002 1992 2002
Non-Agricultural Income
Non-farm labor 15.90% 17.20% 21.30% 39.20%
Enterprise income 4.80% 6.80% 8.80% 5.50%
Remittances 1.30% 3.80% 3.00% 6.20%
Other private transfers 3.90% 5.50% 4.20% 4.20%
Public transfers 0.40% 16.10% 0.20% 4.50%
Other 15.90% 11.80% 13.10% 18.80%
Sub Total 42.20% 61.20% 50.60% 78.40%
(2) Percentages are with respect to total income
Poor (1) (2) Non-Poor (1)  (2)
(1) Poverty defined in terms of food-based poverty line (extreme poverty)
Table 1: Composition of the Rural Income between 1992 
and 2002 Source: World Bank (2004).
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gone from 8.1 percent to 1.5 percent in 2006 while electronic transfers went from 51.5
percent in 1995 to 92.6 percent in 2006. 
However, Mexican immigrants and their families have not been able to take full 
advantage of their additional income. It did not translate into credit, saving or additional
investment opportunities. This is due to several reasons. We will elaborate on these 
reasons in the following paragraphs.
b. Economic Factors Affecting Supply and Demand of Banking Sectors
The first reason that impedes translating the households’ additional income into greater 
integration in the financial markets is the very low degree of “bancarization”. Only 31 
percent of the population has a bank account in Mexico according to the World Bank.6
Low bancarization is due to 
problems in demand as well as 
supply. It is a known fact that 
immigrants do not trust banks. 
Considering that the average age for 
Mexican immigrants in the US is 42 
years, it is not surprising that they 
are distrustful of banks since they 
have witnessed three economic 
recessions in their lives where 
credit card holders and borrowers felt the pain of interest rates that reached up to almost 
160 percent (The Latino Coalition 2002). Please see figure 8. Moreover, many people 
who held deposits with financial institutions lost them. 
On the supply side, banks have not paid much attention to customer acquisition since the 
last economic crisis in 1995. CEPAL (2006: 30) claims that for the year 1999 profits of 
the nine major banks went up by about 74 percent, while the total credit supplied by the 
banking sector fell by 13 percent in the same year. Possible changes in the banks’ 
revenue model may have been based in increasing banking fees to their already captive 
                                                
6 World Development Indicators Online for the year 2004 
12
customer base. Those fees are charged for ATM withdrawal or account and credit 
management for instance. 
Furthermore, Calderon Villarreal and Roa Dueñas (2006) claim that there has been, at 
least in the last 9 years, a crowding out effect taking place in Mexico as the government 
and the Central Bank have increased substantially their debt issues. So banks prefer to 
invest in bonds instead of giving credit to the private sector. In Mexico credit as a 
percentage of GDP is very low. Please see section 7 for an international comparison of 
credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP.
At a micro level, according to Arriola (2006) immigrants’ families use the remittances’ 
money primarily for consumption, specifically on durables, healthcare and housing. 
Therefore, retail stores have 
leveraged this pattern and became 
money transfer operators. These 
stores entice immigrants’ families 
by offering them credit for in-store 
durable products upon picking up 
their remittances. However, such 
forms of credit are very expensive.
At the same time, money transfer 
operators have charged their clients 
very high commissions for the 
transferal of the money for a long period of time. Figure 9 shows that although there have 
been reductions in these fees, they have only occurred after exploiting very high 
commissions for years.
c. The Role of the Authorities
Realizing the importance of remittances as a source of income and its high transfer cost, 
in 2003, in an attempt to decrease the cost of transfers, the Central Bank of Mexico and 
the Fed enabled a system that allows any account holder in the US to send remittances 
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Figure 9: Percentage Cost of sending $200. Source: 
Manuel Orozco (2002) and (2006a).
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through the automated clearinghouses in both countries.7 The system works for sending 
money from account to account and transfers cost a nominal price of approximately 67 
cents of a dollar (Schultz 2005). However, since this system is only for those who have a
bank account the amount of transfers that take place through that system have not met the 
expectations and very few people have been favored by it.
Figure 10 shows the amount of transactions since October 2003 and the volume operated. 
In February 2007 this volume roughly amounted to a 0.71 percent of the aggregate
amount for all transfers 
between the two countries 
and its growth seems to be 
slowing down. 
The reasons for its low 
usage vary but according to 
Manuel Violante8 of 
Banamex immigrants have 
a strong preference for 
immediate cash. He also 
suggested that when being 
faced with two methods of 
transfer, such as Western Union’s Money in Minutes and Economy products – differing 
only in time and price – immigrants go for the fastest delivery method even when it is 
substantially more expensive; and even when the time difference of delivery is only about 
3 days. Violante pointed out what is also mentioned in many surveys: Immigrants are 
distrustful when it comes to services related to their money and prefer to know that it is 
delivered immediately. This preference for high speed may also be a reflection that 
remittances are sent for immediate usage at the receiving country, which points to an 
important policy consideration: system speed matters when it comes to sending money.  
                                                
7 This system is called Federal Reserve Automated Clearing House (FedACH)
8 Violante Macias, Manuel Vice President Mexican Representation Office of Citibank. Interviewed by the 
authors in January 2007.
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Given the very low level of bancarization and potential improvements for the population 
that receives remittances, authorities and banks should look for new and creative 
solutions to provide incentives for the opening of accounts and conducting transfers 
trough the banking sector.
6. Information and Communication Technologies in Mexico
Goal 8, target 18 of the Millennium Development Goals states “in cooperation with the 
private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information 
and communications technologies”. With regard to this target rapid progress was made. 
Phone networks in the developing world tripled during the decade between 1993 and 
2002. In 2002 the number of cell phone subscribers surpassed that of fixed lines. Africa 
showed particularly strong growth in mobile phone subscribers (Juma and Yee-Cheong 
2005: 51).
Mexico needs to catch up as it is lagging behind many other nations in terms of ICT.
Nonetheless, information and communication technologies growth was strong in Mexico 
in recent years too. Possibilities to buy a computer by installments and the arrival of cell 
phones helped to support the fast growth in recent years.
Today about 92 percent of Mexican households have a television. In 2006 45.3 percent of 
the population had cell phones.9 More than 90 percent of all subscribers use prepaid card 
plans (COFETEL 2004: 14). In the fixed line segment growth was sluggish – in 2006 
there were only 19.1 fixed lines per 100 people in Mexico. In 2005 17.4 percent of the
Mexicans were Internet users. Figure 11 illustrates these three indicators of ICT 
development.10 It is interesting to see how strong growth was in cell phones – relatively 
low equipment costs, high convenience and coverage in rural areas makes this technology 
superior to landlines as well as Internet as an information and communication technology 
for the poor.
                                                
9 http://www.cofetel.gob.mx/wb2/COFETEL/COFE_Estadisticas_de_telecomunicaciones_2
10 http://www.cofetel.gob.mx/wb2/COFETEL/COFE_Estadisticas_de_telecomunicaciones_2
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When comparing Mexico regionally across Latin America, it is placed around the
average in terms of mobile phone penetration. Not surprisingly, Chile has the highest cell 
phone penetration with 67.8 percent, followed by Argentina. Mexico with its 45.3 percent 
penetration is about on a level with Brazil (46.3%), Colombia (47.8%) and Venezuela 
(46.7%). At the lower end of the spectrum is Peru with 19.9 percent. 
Mexico is a country with very low investment in information and communication 
technologies. In terms of ICT expenditure as percentage of GDP11 Mexico lags 
significantly behind other Latin American countries. In 2005 Mexico spent only 3.3 
percent of GDP on ICT (the regional average for Latin America and the Caribbean was 
5.9%), where countries such as Peru (6.7%) or Argentina (7.1%) spent about twice as 
much as Mexico. Also in comparison to the other OECD members Mexico spends 
significantly less. The United States for instance spent 8.8 percent of GDP on ICT in 
2005 (World Bank WDI Online).
                                                
11 Information and communications technology expenditures include computer hardware (computers, 
storage devices, printers, and other peripherals); computer software (operating systems, programming tools, 
utilities, applications, and internal software development); computer services (information technology 
consulting, computer and network systems integration, Web hosting, data processing services, and other 
services); and communications services (voice and data communications services) and wired and wireless 
communications equipment.
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The low investment in ICT has translated into relatively slow growth in fixed lines and an
increasing digital divide between rural and urban areas. Figure 12 shows that the 
Southern regions 7 and 8 have a significantly lower cell phone penetration than in other 
regions. The figure shows that cell phone penetration ranges from 35 percent in region 7 
(Veracruz-Llave, Puebla, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Tlaxcala) to 72 percent in Baja California.
In telecommunications, major firms have substantial market power. Telmex has a 
dominant position in long distance, local and mobile markets. In the cell phone market 
for instance, its market share is 80 percent of the total market (Guevara 2006: 10). This 
strong market power results in massive profit margins: Telmex’s profit margins are more 
than twice the ones of its closest competitors. The significant concentration of market 
power leads to high prices charged in Mexico compared to other Latin American 
countries. Businesses phone charges (factoring installation costs, monthly fees, and per 
minute rates) are more than 3 times higher in Mexico than in Argentina and 4 times 
greater than in Brazil (Guerrero et al. 2006: 41). But not only businesses are charged 
higher prices: the price basket for fixed lines in Mexico amounted to US$15.5 a month in 
2004, whereas in the Latin American and the Caribbean region the same basket cost 
US$9.0. The situation is similar in the cell phone segment, although slightly less 
discrepant. The price basket for mobile phones amounted to US$11.4 in Mexico and 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3
Region 4 Region 5 Region 6
Region 7 Region 8 Region 9
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US$9.0 in the region. With respect to Internet Mexico is actually cheaper than the 
regional average, US$22.6 and US$31.5 respectively.12
In Mexico, the realization of 
financial transactions over the 
Internet is still underdeveloped. In 
2005 merely 5.8 percent of the 
Mexican population had ever 
conducted electronic payments. 
Nonetheless the Internet is gaining 
in importance and with increased 
trust in the means of payment in 
combination with higher family 
income electronic transactions will 
increasingly be conducted (INEGI 
2005: 17-18).
As will be argued in section 8 of 
this paper, in a number of developing countries mobile phones are already used as a 
means of payment. The section provides the reader with the examples of Kenya, the 
Philippines and South Africa. As illustrated in figure 13 the cell phone penetration rates 
are quite comparable in Mexico, the Philippines and South Africa. Kenya on the other 
hand is lagging far behind. Nevertheless, even though Kenya’s penetration rate is low 
compared to other countries, effective accessibility is much higher. The Vodafone Policy 
Paper Series (2005) argues that “the way in which mobiles are informally shared between 
people, the formation of private resellers of mobile services and the provision of mobile 
phones for public use, all increase accessibility, even in rural communities. The impact of
mobile extends well beyond what might be suggested by the number of subscriptions 
alone.” So although official penetration rates are not as high as in developed countries 
they are still much higher than Internet usage or landline penetration and significantly 
higher than the percentage of the population that is banked, i.e. people who have a bank 
                                                
12 http://devdata.worldbank.org/ict/mex_ict.pdf
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account. Consequently, given cell phones’ increased processing power they would be the 
obvious means to have people take part in the financial sector. 
7. Financial Exclusion in Mexico
According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators about 31 percent of the 
population has a bank account in Mexico. However, estimates on bank account 
ownership vary widely – 20 percent is probably a more likely value. Klaehn et al. (2006: 
3) state for instance “between 15 and 25 percent of the urban population, and as low as 6 
percent of the rural population, has access to accounts in financial institutions.” It 
continues to state that there exists ”strong latent demand for small deposit services in 
Mexico, and a high level of consensus about the need for a more inclusive financial 
system.”
Caskey et al (2004: 5-6) argue that there are three major reasons why access to bank 
accounts is not as available as in developed countries: firstly, the Mexican financial and 
banking market is highly concentrated. The five largest banks hold 82 percent of all 
deposits in Mexico City for example (In New York, one of the most highly concentrated 
urban markets in the US the five largest banks hold merely 54 percent). In rural setting 
competition is much lower, so concentration is even higher. Most of the poor live in rural 
areas, where banking coverage is very low. Secondly, credit bureaus are little developed 
and “there can be little meaningfully predictive automated credit risk assessments for 
most lower- income Mexican households” (Caskey et al: 6). Thirdly, low labor costs in 
Mexico lead to financial institutions having little incentive to implement labor-displacing 
financial services technologies, which would augment efficiencies and financial 
institutions’ ability to evaluate poor people’s credit risk. 
The World Bank (2004a) shows the types of financial instruments that the poor use and 
how these evolve as people move up to higher deciles. Only starting at the 6th decile
people start using formal banking mechanisms in Mexico (see table 2).
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Type of Financial Instruments Income Group of Median User 
(Decile)
Informal banking instruments
Tandas* 5th
Savings at home 6th
Coop of “Caja Popular”** 6th
Overall Unbanked 5th
Formal banking instruments
Savings, debit card or “AFORE”*** account 7th
Checking account 9th
Investment account 9th
Overall banked 8th
* Tandas are informal rotating savings clubs
** Coop and Cajas Populares are savings and loan cooperatives
*** AFORE are personal retirement funds
Table 2: The Use of Financial Instruments among the Mexican Poor. Source: World Bank (2004a).
Especially in rural areas the financial sector’s outreach is very low. The following table 3
compares Mexico’s financial sector with the countries discussed in the case studies in 
section 8 of this report. Mexico, South Africa and the Philippines are very similar in 
terms of financial infrastructure (as was the case for mobile penetration). However, 
Kenya lags behind – only 7 percent of the Kenyan population is banked. 
Mexico South Africa Philippines Kenya
Bank branches per 100,000 
people (2004)
7.6 6.0 7.8 1.4
Financial Information 
Infrastructure13, 0 = little, 10 is 
well developed (2005)
8 6 6 3.5
Bank Deposit Accounts per 100 
people (2004)
31% -- 30% 7%
Table 3: The financial sector in selected countries. Source: World Bank, WDI Online
Given Mexico’s level of per capita GDP its financial infrastructure is underdeveloped.
Figure 14 depicts this – according to the graph one would expect about 50-55 percent of 
households to have a bank account. 
                                                
13 Financial information infrastructure index is based on 10 measures, 6 covering the scope, quality, and 
availability of credit reporting data (in private and public registries) and the existence of a basic legal 
framework for credit reporting, and 4 covering the availability of public registry data for collateral (fixed 
and moveable) and corporate registries and court records.
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Nonetheless, recent developments such as the agreement of all major Mexican banks to 
implement PagoMóvil, a payment mechanism that facilitates paying at Point-of-Sale
(POS) in shops with cell phones or the rapid expansion of ATMs across the country could 
assist to include more people in the financial system in the near future. The usage and 
availability of ATMs has greatly increased. On a national level, during the first quarter of 
2005, there were 67,596 ATMs and in 2006 they reached 76,050.14 This means that 
during one year 8,454 more ATMs (+12.5 percent) were installed in Mexico.
Additionally, the Mexican government is trying to improve the regulatory framework for 
financial intermediaries, especially the institutions that offer services to the unbanked. In 
2001, the Congress passed the Popular Savings and Credit Law, which regulates 
institutions that provide financial services to the poor.15 Prior to that, little protection was 
provided to customers of non-regulated financial intermediaries. 
                                                
14 Source: Central Bank of Mexico
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Another problem is access to finance in Mexico. While close to 70 percent of the 
moderate poor own their houses, merely 5 percent pay interests for their houses. The low 
level of interest payments paid by the poor is an indicator for the predominantly self-
financed process of house acquisition and construction (World Bank 2004a). Figure 15
compares Mexico’s credit provided by banks as a percentage of GDP with the other three 
countries of the case studies treated in section 8. 
Even though it can be seen above that Mexico’s financial infrastructure is significantly 
more developed than Kenya’s, in terms of credit provided by the banking sector as 
percentage of GDP it is on the same level. The lack of financing for Small and Medium 
Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and new entrants is a significant problem. As Guerrero et al 
(2006: 41) state “while Mexico’s financial system appears to now have escaped from the 
long history of concentrated control by the domestic economic elite, private credit 
remains extremely low by international standards. Foreign control undoubtedly helped 
solve the problem of low asset quality and connected lending, but has left Mexico with an 
unusually risk-averse banking system.”
8. International Experiences Using Cell Phones for Financial Inclusion
Technology has a huge potential to promote financial development in the developing
world. Access to finance and financial markets in general is considered to be one of the 
key constraints for private sector development in developing countries. Micro and small 
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enterprises – often the backbone of a country’s economy – are usually most affected by 
such lack of financial infrastructure provision. In Mexico it is estimated that there exist 
about 4.5 million small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which absorb 64 percent
of the Mexican labor force and contribute 40 percent to GDP.16
a. The Digital Divide
International experience shows
that Information and 
Communication Technologies 
(ICT) can contribute 
substantially to a country’s 
economic and social 
development. As Sam Pitroda, an 
Indian entrepreneur, ICT expert 
and policymaker puts it: “As a 
great social leveler, information 
technology is second only to 
death” (Pitroda 1993: 66). The 
Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP) reports in Africa alone, the number of mobile phone subscribers has 
reached 155 million. This represents having grown a remarkable 360 percent in three 
years.17
We know from classical growth theory that there exists divergence in economic growth 
across countries. However, on the technological side, we can find convergence (see 
figure 16).18 So why not leverage on this finding to have technology bridge the gap?
In 2005 the Global Digital Solidarity Fund was launched to finance infrastructure 
projects that close the digital divide in developing countries. However, the availability of 
                                                
16 http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulos/27540.html
17 http://cgap.org/portal/site/portfolio/Feb2007Lead1/
18 The situation is comparable for other information and communication technologies such as Internet or 
fixed line phones.
Figure 16: Mobile phone subscribers per 100 inhabitants. 
Source: http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/statistics/ict/graphs/mobile.jpg
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a computer is only productivity increasing if obstacles such as education and lack of food 
or electricity can be overcome. The Economist states that “rather than trying to close the 
divide for the sake of it, the more sensible goal is to determine how best to use 
technology to promote bottom-up development. And the answer to that question turns out 
to be remarkably clear: by promoting the spread not of PCs and the Internet, but of 
mobile phones” (The Economist 1995).
b. Mobile Phones, Productivity and Banking Inclusion
Research showed that cell phones enhance productivity. Roller and Wavermann (2001) 
showed that there exists a causal link between the existence of telecommunications 
infrastructure (fixed lines) and economic growth in the developed world using data for 
the OECD from 1970 to 1990 – once a critical level of service of fixed lines is provided. 
In a later study Waverman et al (2005) looked at 92 countries over 23 years from 1980 to 
2003. This time emphasis was put on mobile phones and their impact on economic 
growth. The authors of the study use an endogenous-growth model to find that the rollout 
of mobile phones had a significant effect on economic growth in both, developed and 
developing countries. The interesting finding however is that the impact in the 
developing world is about twice as big as in the developed world, which makes it similar 
to the rollout of fixed line phones in the developed world in the 1970s. The authors find 
that a 10 percent increase in mobile phone penetration causes a 0.6 percent increase in 
economic growth for the average developing country. 
A good example for productivity increases through the usage of cell phones would be 
fishermen who can check prices in several markets before they decide at which market 
they are going to sell their fish. So demand and supply can be balanced through the usage 
of cell phones.19
Another exceptional example is Grameen Phone. Grameen Phone’s founder is Iqbal 
Quadir, a former lecturer at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. Grameen Phone 
is the epitome of a new breed of businesses in Bangladesh: for-profit companies 
                                                
19 See Prof. Robert Jensen’s research on fishermen in Kerala who use mobile phones to find out at which 
market they can get the highest price for their fish for example.
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leveraging on ICT that engage in inclusive capitalism. Grameen Phone works thus: a 
female Bangladeshi entrepreneur takes out a loan from Grameen Bank to finance the 
acquisition of a cell phone. These phones are then leased out to village dwellers for a 
small charge. The so-called phone ladies in turn can use the revenues from leasing out the 
phone to pay back the loan. They earn on average US$750 a year, which is about twice 
the average Bangladeshi annual income. Today Grameen Phone provides access to
communication and information to more than a hundred million of people. Grameen 
Phone started its service in 1997. Not even ten years later Grameen Phone has more than 
ten million subscribers with revenues above US$1bn and annual profits surpassing 
US$200 million (Sullivan 2007: xvii-xviii). Grameen Phone is a remarkable story – it 
shows how private sector profit making notions and development can perfectly be 
combined. 
Cell phones can increase productivity in a number of areas – as Eggleston, Jensen and 
Zeckhauser (2002: 71) put it – “ICTs are the gift that keep on giving; once in place, they 
can be used to transmit information for a variety of uses, at little additional cost.” These 
areas include but are not limited to healthcare (Tracnet, Syncing data from all HIV 
treatment clinics in Rwanda), agriculture (Manobi, Agricultural information and 
marketplace through SMS in Senegal), education (OneWorld, Health and job information 
via SMS in Kenya), government (Rakan, Community/ Police Relations via SMS in 
Malaysia) or banking (Wizzit, Financial Services for unbanked South Africans). 
This paper focuses on the application of mobile phones to achieve financial inclusion. 
Poor people, so they can benefit from financial markets, need to have access to the 
financial system where they are living – usually in small villages and slums. But banks do 
not consider setting up a branch network as economically viable in such places, so in the 
past rural and very poor areas have historically been financially underserved. Low levels 
of education and a lack of trust in the banking system pose additional obstacles to 
financial integration of the poor. Traditional branch based banking systems may be 
impossible to replicate in the developing world. But a number of devices and 
technologies such as point-of-sale devices and mobile phones combined with banking 
agents, automatic teller machines (ATMs) and shared information system platforms make 
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the outreach to undeserved segments of the population more viable. Dan Schatt, Celent 
Senior Analyst and advisor to CGAP on technology argues that “the growth of Internet 
and mobile usage, along with advances in biometric technologies, will begin to have a 
particularly profound impact on how individuals and households live their lives in the 
remotest of regions. Payment authentication and identity verification capabilities along 
with other core payment and banking technologies can now be leveraged to empower 
unbanked individuals to conduct their basic financial affairs and create a systemic 
contribution to emerging economies.”20 Such new technologies make transactions much 
cheaper (see figure 17). Even though the costs shown in the figure are from the United 
States, the same holds for the costs incurred by banks in developing countries. 
Consequently, it becomes more attractive for financial companies to provide services to 
undeserved segments to achieve sales growth.
c. M-banking in the International Perspective – Selected Examples
The empowerment of the poor through cell phones is this paper’s central theme. There 
already exist a number of cases in the world where such empowerment has already 
materialized through the usage of cell phones. The following paragraphs will briefly 
describe a number of experiences around the world.
                                                
20 http://cgap.org/portal/site/portfolio/Feb2007Lead1/
Figure 17: Cost per financial transaction for US banks in US$. Source: Ivatury (2006).
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i. South Africa
In South Africa banks have realized that the unbanked segment of the population 
represents a large growth potential. Wizzit and MTN Banking both offer financial 
services to the low income, unbanked segment through cell phones. In South Africa 48 
percent of the adult population are unbanked or underbanked. However, cell phone 
penetration is high with more than 20 million mobile phone subscribers nationwide, of 
which 80 percent are prepaid customers. 
Wizzit is a division of the South African Bank of Athens. Wizzit offers its customers an 
interest-bearing bank account, which can easily be accessed through cell phones. Further 
features include money transfers, person-to-person payments and airtime purchases. 
Moreover, Wizzit customers get issued a Maestro card that enables them to withdraw 
money at cash machines and to purchase in shops. A survey implemented by CGAP 
confirmed that the service quality perceived by Wizzit customers is very high: ninety 
percent of the people asked stated that the service provided was inexpensive (about a 
third cheaper than a comparable account offered by major South African brick and mortar 
banks). It was also verified that the service is significantly faster and perceived as safer 
than branch and ATM channels.  
It is quite puzzling that such services can work in a country where the literacy rate among 
adults is only 82 percent (in Mexico it is 91 percent), as these services are precisely 
targeted towards the lowest income segment with least education.21
Other banks have also realized the potential of the unbanked segment in South Africa. 
First National Bank as well as Standard Bank also entered M-banking. The latter teamed 
up with MTN, a telecommunications company, to offer MTN Banking. MTN banking is a 
joint venture between the two firms: cell phone SIM cards are distributed through MTN’s 
dealers, but customers actually hold a bank account with Standard Bank. First National 
Bank implemented the service itself and offers it as an alternative service (Ivatury 2006: 
9). 
                                                
21 World Bank, World Development Indicators Online 
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ii. Philippines
Even though M-banking is quite developed in South Africa, its cradle is the Philippines. 
Philippines is a country with massive usage of SMS technology – its usage is more 
prevalent than anywhere in the world and that helped M-banking to be an immediately 
accepted application. The two incumbent Telecom companies – Globe Telecom and 
Smart Communications – are both very innovative companies, offering services to the 
poor and unbanked in the Philippines. Smart Money was introduced in 2000 and was the 
world’s first electronic wallet. Smart Money can be used like a debit card where the cash 
is transferred via SMS technology. Smart realized that it was necessary to offer prepaid 
cards in tiny denominations to make their usage attractive to the bottom-of-the-pyramid 
segment. Physical prepaid cards were soon replaced by electronic loading in more than 
700,000 outlets nationwide. Sari Sari (neighborhood shops) rely on social networks and 
relationship marketing in the Philippines. Owners of such Sari Saris commonly extend 
credit for staples to their customers, which they know very well. Now phone credit in the 
form of minutes could be purchased on credit as well. Even if a person did not have cash 
it could now get phone credit. Smart virtually converts neighborhood shops into 
microlenders. The shops do not earn interest on the credits extended, but rather earn a 15 
percent commission from Smart. Of the 700,000 outlets Smart counts as its network 
about 90 percent are Sari Saris. Through very innovative approaches Smart achieved an 
incredible outreach across the entire country. Six years after it started operations in 1999, 
Smart counted more than 21 million subscribers, which generated about US$1.4 billion 
with profit margins of 66 percent. This story also shows that a country’s poor population 
can be empowered through very profitable business. Smart’s competitor, Globe Telecom, 
also offers M-banking to the unbanked. Its products are similar. Remarkable though is the 
fact that Globe is collaborating with the local Rural Bankers’ Association for making 
loan repayments and with Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) to advance micro loans. 
In the context of remittances both, Globe and Smart are closest to globally offer transfers 
of remittances through cell phones. They see remittances as an extension to their existing 
M-banking business. Nevertheless, on the sending side, money needs to be paid in 
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physically, i.e. the sender needs to go to a branch abroad to be identified for regulatory 
reasons (AML and CFT) and to get the cash into the system. The recipient of the 
remittance is immediately notified via SMS that she was credited the amount on her 
electronic wallet, which can be used in shops or transformed into cash at any Smart of 
Globe store (Sullivan: 135-140 and InfoDev 2006). 
iii. Kenya
In Kenya Safaricom, an affiliate of Vodafone, allows clients of the Kenyan MFI called 
Faulu to repay and receive loans through its M-Pesa product line. Safaricom allows 
Faulu to piggyback on its infrastructure, thus reducing the overall costs of distribution 
and collection of the loan: the credit for the loan can be exchanged for cash at any 
Safaricom dealer. M-Pesa allows subscribers to transfer or withdraw cash or prepaid 
minutes and to manage the account over the mobile phone (Ivatury 2006: 4-5). In 
February 2007 Safaricom announced that it was going to launch a global remittance 
sending service through collaboration with Citigroup later in the year. The trial will 
involve people living in the UK being able to send remittances home to Kenya over their 
cell phone. Allegedly neither sender nor receiver will need a bank account and costs are 
expected to be half that of the ones charged currently by money transmitters such as 
Western Union or MoneyGram.22
9. Feasibility of Integrating Cell Phones to the Remittance Market in Mexico
The following section seeks to evaluate the relationship between remittances, cell phone 
penetration and savings accounts, as a proxy for banking services, for the 32 Mexican 
states. The authors use a fixed effects model to capture this relationship. 
a. The Relationship between Banking Accounts, Remittances and Cell 
Phone Penetration
To understand the relationship among banking accounts, remittances and cell phone 
penetration we undertook econometric analyses in an attempt to explain the number of 
savings accounts as a proxy for banking services. This is a good approximation given the 
                                                
22 http://money.guardian.co.uk/consumernews/story/0,,2014982,00.html#article_continue
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constraints on the data and given that savings accounts are the most basic banking 
product in Mexico (as opposed to credit accounts which have more requirements). The 
regressions were estimated utilizing panel data for the 31 Mexican states as well as the 
Federal District (Mexico City). The structure of the model is similar to that of fixed 
effects but using the dummy variable method – a method that allows for greater 
flexibility.23 We assigned a dummy variable to each State and also took into account the 
time-structure of the data by including a time trend.
The structure of the model is the following: 
 populationratiopopulationbranchesincomecesremitcelusersfingsBankingsav ,,,,tan,
Various specifications were calculated to take into account fixed effects through the 
inclusion of dummy variables and a time trend in the data. At the same time to avoid 
problems of magnitude, the regressions were run in logs.
The best specification was a fixed effects specification in log form:
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The results of the regressions and the chosen specification (far left of the table on the next 
page) are shown on the following page. It was chosen due to the highest permitted 
flexibility – as a consequence of the squared trend – and comprehensiveness.
                                                
23 The fixed effects methodology allows us to use the information that Panel Data provide and at the same 
time account for the effects of unobserved variables in the data and trend components. This methodology is 
superior to that of time series or cross section alone since it minimizes the risk of omitted variable bias and 
provides greater flexibility to allow for time-variant relationships. For a more detailed treatment of the 
estimation method, please refer to the appendix and also: Wooldridge (2002) and Hausman et al (1984).
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Dependent Variab le logsavings logsav ings savingspercap sav ingspercap savingspercap logsav ings logsav ings
logcelusers -2.917 -1.699 -2.9 -2.932
(5.76)** (4.17)** (5.65)** (5.59)**
logrem esas 9.531 14.202 9.524 9.355
(5.81)** (9.63)** (5.84)** (5.70)**
trend2 -0.147 5.827 24.659 -0.143 -0.163
(2.29)* (6.20)** (11.97 )** (2.33)* (2.61)*
logbranches 5.925 6.066 145.227 99.732 -34 .789 5.899 6.025
(5.19)** (7.15)** (4.93)** (3.69)** (-1 .52 ) (5.31)** (5.05)**
popruralratio 32.605 4.148 120.114 1022 .893 -350.56 34.014
(1.33) (0.25) (0.2) (1.36) (-0 .47 ) (1.41)
Índice de ingreso 4.9 -13.206 -274.72 -370.968 -963 .284 3.831 0.77
(0.16) (-0.61) (-0 .37) (-0.49) (-1 .26 ) (0.13) (0.02)
popu lation 0 0.001 0.06 0.03 0.021 0.001
(-0.25) (1.66) (1.04) (0.76) (0.8) (0.55)
State D um m y ZACATECAS -4.028 24.679 373.986 -607.167 -256 .471 -8.414 19.251
(-0.16) (1.5) (0.55) (-0.84) (-0 .47 ) (-0.5) (1.11)
State D um m y Y U CATAN 20.017 51.103 318.902 -397.593 -308 .843 16.235 34.518
(1.04) (4.27)** (0.6) (-0.77) (-0 .86 ) (1.54) (2.21)*
State D um m y VE RACR U Z -10 .165 1.647 -139.102 -709.473 -399 .218 -11.788 4.156
(-0.7) (0.16) (-0 .34) (-1.5) (-1 .06 ) (-0.93) (0.46)
State D um m y TLAX CALA 17.235 42.579 510.47 -230.58 -412 .047 13.135 30.258
(0.84) (3.40)** (0.87) (-0.42) (-1 .12 ) (1.22) (1.68)
State D um m y TAM AULIPAS 14.638 31.51 187.559 -265.803 -315 .121 11.674 22.497
(1.06) (3.96)** (0.47) (-0.77) (-1 .38 ) (2.01) (1.8)
State D um m y TAB ASC O 12.536 45.513 302.181 -560.584 -302 .869 8.579 31.945
(0.57) (3.23)** (0.5) (-0.89) (-0 .65 ) (0.61) (2.01)
State D um m y SO NO RA 17.093 40.449 247.614 -312.805 -269 .944 13.77 27.939
(1.08) (4.25)** (0.56) (-0.78) (-0 .98 ) (1.85) (2.06)*
State D um m y SIN ALO A 2.769 25.914 185.971 -559.788 -285 .185 -0.802 20.153
(0.14) (2.08)* (0.35) (-1.01) (-0 .69 ) (-0.07) (1.44)
State D um m y SAN  LU IS PO TO SI 0.473 24.229 260.958 -528.9 -289 .457 -3.21 18.481
(0.02) (1.86) (0.47) (-0.92) (-0 .68 ) (-0.25) (1.27)
State D um m y Q U IN TANA R OO 28.268 54.806 488.607 -125.645 -239 .144 24.434 39.235
(1.59) (5.22)** (0.99) (-0.3) (-0 .87 ) (3.18)** (2.46)*
State D um m y Q U ER ETAR O 9.421 33.27 381.689 -320.164 -244.84 5.604 24.058
(0.51) (2.90)** (0.74) (-0.66) (-0 .72 ) (0.59) (1.61)
State D um m y PU EB LA -9.755 5.933 28.737 -646.475 -313 .112 -12.237 7.19
(-0.58) (0.52) (0.06) (-1.25) (-0 .77 ) (-0.93) (0.69)
State D um m y O AXACA -14 .601 10.677 173.021 -820.549 -304 .121 -18.223 10.841
(-0.59) (0.64) (0.26) (-1.08) (-0 .51 ) (-0.94) (0.74)
State D um m y N U EVO  LEO N 15.845 30.354 55.383 -240.994 -273 .264 13.58 20.532
(1.59) (5.41)** (0.19) (-1.07) (-1 .92 ) (3.97)** (2.16)*
State D um m y N AYAR IT 8.615 35.942 466.18 -383.342 -331 .111 4.312 26.222
(0.39) (2.56)* (0.74) (-0.62) (-0 .76 ) (0.34) (1.48)
State D um m y M O RE LO S 10.042 27.254 396.252 -183.858 -335 .555 6.403 20.004
(0.58) (2.69)* (0.8) (-0.42) (-1 .17 ) (0.85) (1.29)
State D um m y M IC H O ACAN -18 .039 -4.725 233.756 -450.88 -213 .605 -21.08 0.023
(-0.93) (-0.36) (0.44) (-0.78) (-0 .49 ) (-1.45) (0)
State D um m y ES TADO  D E M E XICO -10 .287 -14.715 -489.71 -553.988 -515 .932 -8.708 -9.118
(-1.22) (3.03)** (-1 .64) (2.35)* (2.78)** (-1.46) (-1.05)
State D um m y JALIS CO 0.26 7.565 -161.725 -518.397 -420 .597 -1.307 7.857
(0.02) (1.03) (-0 .51) (-1.54) (-1 .61 ) (-0.15) (0.85)
State D um m y H ID ALG O -6.316 14.869 323.593 -533.883 -314 .517 -10.151 13.464
(-0.29) (1.03) (0.54) (-0.84) (-0 .67 ) (-0.69) (0.86)
State D um m y G U ER RE R O -14 .178 4.537 249.605 -571.265 -258 .397 -17.627 6.032
(-0.68) (0.33) (0.45) (-0.94) (-0 .56 ) (-1.2) (0.44)
State D um m y G U ANAJU AT O -8.143 2.175 63.562 -464.105 -327 .272 -10.558 3.993
(-0.56) (0.23) (0.16) (-1.1) (-1 .05 ) (-1.04) (0.37)
State D um m y D U RANG O 7.592 33.509 399.396 -367.419 -288 .547 3.658 23.644
(0.38) (2.66)* (0.72) (-0.68) (-0 .75 ) (0.33) (1.49)
State D um m y C H IHU AHU A 13.199 30.826 169.439 -326.297 -305 .891 10.238 22.666
(0.93) (3.63)** (0.42) (-0.87) (-1 .2 ) (1.48) (1.84)
State D um m y C H IAPAS -11 .126 19.074 143.272 -778.659 -154 .581 -14.243 13.513
(-0.52) (1.3) (0.26) (-1.2) (-0 .28 ) (-0.83) (1.31)
State D um m y C O LIM A 23.461 49.759 568.85 -57.735 -266 .677 19.472 33.673
(1.28) (4.61)** (1.09) (-0.13) (-0 .96 ) (2.68)* (2)
State D um m y C O AHU ILA */ 22.68 37.661 211.67 -218.453 -483 .555 19.428 27.737
(1.38) (4.05)** (0.44) (-0.52) (-1 .62 ) (2.25)* (1.72)
State D um m y C AM PEC H E 22.549 62.501 553.45 -316.597 -152 .937 18.311 41.42
(1.02) (4.35)** (0.97) (-0.56) (-0 .37 ) (1.42) (2.46)*
State D um m y B AJA C AL IFO R N IA S UR 35.485 73.999 574.265 -204.012 -227 .084 31.216 50.452
(1.68) (5.57)** (1.01) (-0.39) (-0 .63 ) (2.80)** (2.81)**
Specifications
State D um m y B AJA CALIFO R NIA N O RT E 21.076 39.555 253.587 -179.148 -279.477 18.031 28.002
(1.53) (5 .08)** (0 .64) (-0 .55) (-1.34) (3 .49)** (2 .18)*
State D um m y AG UASC ALIEN T ES 16.679 37.102 526.779 -59.782 -261.199 12.899 26.259
(0.97) (3 .71)** (1 .06) (-0 .15) (-0.99) (1 .98) (1 .66)
trend -2 .296 20.981 -103.976
(6.49)** (5.09)** (10.02)**
celu sers 0 0
(-0 .16) (-0 .8) (-1.58)
Co nstant -59.395 -93.742 -996.863 -260.576 1340.061 -54.662 -59.66
(-1 .73) (4 .57)** (-1 .04) (-0 .3) (1 .82) (2 .10)* (-1 .69)
Rem ittances -0 .064 -0.082 -0.042
(3.12)** (2 .56)* (-1.42)
O bservations 128 128 128 128 128 128 128
R-squared 0.84 0.90 0.84 0.87 0.93 0.84 0.83
Ro bust t s tatistics in  parentheses
* s ignificant at 5% ; ** s ig nificant at 1%
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Throughout the different specifications there is consistency in the signs of the coefficients 
for the explanatory variables. The first three columns from left to right show that the 
effect of cell users on savings (even in the savings per capita case in the third column) is 
always negative and significant even at a 1 percent level. The effect of remittances is 
always positive for savings, either per capita or in logs, and significant without falling 
outside the 10 percent significance range. As for the effect of bank branches there is also 
a positive effect across specifications, however, it does not show significance for the case 
of savings per capita. 
Another robust result is that the level of income is not significant nor is the population 
level. The trend and state dummies allow for the calculation of fixed effects and are 
jointly significant in all the cases. 
The specification on the far left was chosen given its flexibility due to a squared trend,
significance and consistency of the variables. The results on this equation show that there 
is a strong and statistically significant positive relationship between remittances’ inflows 
and the number of saving accounts. For each increase of 1 percent in remittances there is 
a 9 percent increase in savings accounts. Previous studies showed ambiguous results, but 
mostly confirming the positive relationship between remittances and savings. Fajnzylber 
and López (2007) state for instance that “recipients [of remittances] save more than non-
recipients, the only exceptions being Mexico and El Salvador.” Orozco (2006b: 5) on the 
other hand finds that
“… evidence from Latin America South East Asia and Africa suggests that both senders and 
recipients tend to increase their savings and investment when remittances flow over a stable period 
of time, thus providing a space to set up small businesses or invest in real estate. Specifically, 
remittance flows increase by 25% when the sender has a savings account in his or her home 
country. When senders have a savings account, they are three times more likely to send money to 
support a family business. In addition, each year of remitting is associated with a 20% increase in 
sending money to pay off loans. From the perspective of the beneficiary, recipients with bank 
accounts receive 27% more. The longer a person has been receiving remittances, the higher the 
likelihood that they will run a business; what’s more, having a bank account while receiving 
remittances also increases the chances of the beneficiary having a business.“
Our results are in line with Orozco’s findings, contradicting Fajnzylber and López, for 
the case of Mexico. We argue that Mexican households that receive remittances have 
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significantly higher savings. At the same time, although immigrants’ families are poor, 
they have saving capacity. 
With respect to the number of branches, the relationship is positive, as previously 
expected. The presence of this variable is probably rendering insignificant the effect of 
the income index given that the presence of bank branches can be a good proxy for each 
state’s income. A 1 percent increase in the number of branches is related to a 5 percent
increase in the number of saving accounts. 
At the same time the regression also shows two important results a) It cannot be rejected 
that there exists no relationship between the variable proportion of rural population and 
the number of accounts. This can be the result of the fact that in the construction of the 
ratio the total population is taken into account and this measure is also considered to 
calculate the cell users variable. The cell users variable was constructed by multiplying 
the cell phone penetration by the population (both at state level). And b) that there is a 
strong relationship between the number of cell phone users and the number of savings 
accounts. This finding is controversial since a first approach may lead us to believe that 
the more cell users the higher the savings. Hence, reverse causality might be a problem. 
However, to verify that in fact there is a causal relationship between the number of cell 
phone users and the amount of saving accounts we ran Granger causality tests (Granger 
1969). We found that the causality runs only from cell users to saving accounts, 
eliminating other two possible causal relationships: firstly, that there exists simultaneous 
causality, i.e. cell users cause savings and vice versa; and secondly, that saving accounts 
cause cell users, but not the other way around. Table 4 shows the results for the causality 
tests. It can be seen that the null hypothesis of non-causality between cell phone users and
savings accounts can be rejected even at a 99 percent confidence level.
Granger Causality Test F-value P-value
H0: Savings accounts do not cause cell users 0.23 0.79
H0: Cell users do not cause savings accounts 6.04 0.01
Table 4: Study Results of Granger Tests for Causality
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These results are relevant for the 
explanation of the negative sign between 
call phone users and savings found in 
the regression. We found three theories 
that may explain that result. However, 
all explanations undoubtedly lead to 
the same conclusion: the opportunity 
of increasing the mobile banking 
industry. Before venturing an
explanation it is important to show that 
there are two effects through which 
remittances flows are affecting the 
number of accounts: 
a) A direct positive impact on 
savings accounts and,
b) An indirect negative effect 
through the number of users of 
cell phones (remittances increase 
cell phone users but more cell 
phone users cause falls on 
savings accounts).
To clarify the second point, the positive 
relationship between remittances and 
cell users is estimated in table 5. As can 
be noticed in the two specifications 
presented, the remittances variable 
(logremesas) has a positive relation with 
Dependent Variable logcelusers logcelusers
logpoprural 3.05 4.456
(1.91) (2.43)*
logremesas 0.938 0.983
(5.66)** (5.77)**
State Dummy ZACATECAS 3.382 1.221
(1.76) (0.71)
State Dummy YUCATAN 6.246 5.212
(2.61)* (2.88)**
State Dummy VERACRUZ 0.456 0.691
(2.53)* (0.71)
State Dummy TLAXCALA 6.857 5.383
(1.95) (1.91)
State Dummy TAMAULIPAS 7.411 8.038
(2.60)* (3.34)**
State Dummy TABASCO 4.461 3.034
(2.72)* (2.45)*
State Dummy SONORA 6.967 6.777
(2.73)* (3.46)**
State Dummy SINALOA 4.155 3.201
(2.95)** (3.68)**
State Dummy SAN LUIS POTOSI 3.358 2.243
(2.25)* (2.34)*
State Dummy QUINTANA ROO 10.716 9.716
(2.64)* (2.96)**
State Dummy QUERETARO 6.212 4.999
(2.30)* (2.45)*
State Dummy PUEBLA 0.975 0.718
(4.10)** (1.48)
State Dummy OAXACA -0.027 -1.323
(-0.13) (2.17)*
State Dummy NUEVO LEON 9.406 11.475
(2.67)* (3.24)**
State Dummy NAYARIT 5.948 3.861
(1.93) (1.5)
State Dummy MORELOS 7.246 6.777
(2.10)* (2.54)*
State Dummy MICHOACAN 0.653 0
(1.03) (.)
State Dummy ESTADO DE MEXICO 2.041 4.758
(2.36)* (1.77)
State Dummy JALISCO 3.87 4.973
(3.69)** (3.29)**
State Dummy HIDALGO 2.519 1.176
(1.85) (1.3)
State Dummy GUERRERO 0.973 -0.09
(1.15) (-0.23)
State Dummy GUANAJUATO 2.167 2.347
(2.24)* (3.07)**
State Dummy DURANGO 4.961 3.572
(1.96) (1.86)
State Dummy CHIHUAHUA 6.463 6.772
(2.85)** (3.71)**
State Dummy CHIAPAS 0 -0.996
(.) (-1.68)
State Dummy COLIMA 10.906 9.355
(2.07)* (2.13)*
State Dummy COAHUILA */ 9.812 10.999
(2.45)* (3.09)**
State Dummy CAMPECHE 7.898 5.511
(2.32)* (1.84)
State Dummy BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR 11.415 8.973
(2.48)* (2.23)*
State Dummy BAJA CALIFORNIA NORTE 9.069 9.9
(2.67)* (3.36)**
State Dummy AGUASCALIENTES 8.991 8.221
(2.05)* (2.33)*
trend2 0.007 0.01
(1.21) (1.75)
logpop -2.594
(-1.27)
Constant -19.608 -8.48
(-1.55) (-0.61)
Specifications
Observations 186 186
R-squared 0.96 0.97
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 5: Cell users estimated as dependent variable.
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cell users, and in both cases the variables are statistically significant even at the 1 percent
level. The regressions also controls for fixed effects through a quadratic time trend and 
state dummy variables.
Recalling both points mentioned above, figure 18 summarizes the interrelations of the 
principal variables:
Figure 18: Demonstration of Relationship between Principal Variables of the Study.
The first explanation for the negative sign on the cell phone users variable on explaining 
saving accounts is that there are different subsets of the population at different parts of 
their budget constraint (as a result of different preferences). When provided with 
remittances, one subset may increase its savings whereas other subsets increase 
consumption. Those that save will generate a positive increase in the number of accounts 
(therefore the positive sign between remittances and saving accounts). Those who 
consume more, will also buy more cell phones (positive relationship between remittances 
and cell phone users) and show a substitution effect between cell users and savings
(negative sign between savings accounts and cell phones). This does not mean that there 
is a long term substitution effect, it only means that those that consume more cell phones 
as a result of remittances may only be deciding to postpone the opening of saving 
accounts for later. 
Cell phone users
Remittances Saving accounts
-
+
+
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The second explanation of the negative sign between cell users and savings accounts
hinges on the empirical fact that cell phone penetration is higher than fixed line 
penetration in rural towns. See figures 11 and 12 in section 6, which show that even in 
the least developed regions in Mexico cell phone penetration is well above 30 percent, 
whereas fixed lines per a hundred users are only about 20 percent. This is not surprising 
as purchasing a cell phone is cheaper than the installation of fixed telephone lines. Once 
said that, it may be the case that banks are neglecting rural towns as a business niche and 
regard them as not business worthy, because cell phone penetration is not factored into 
their decision to establish a branch. This may be because these towns fare badly in other 
indicators of development such as number of fixed lines or income for instance. 
Naturally, banks may not only fail to open a branch in a town on that basis – even in 
cases where cell phone penetration is high – but in addition they may not even establish 
ATMs. This can help explain the negative relationship between cell phone users and 
saving accounts. For many people it is just too much hassle to open an account, as they 
would have to go far to withdraw cash or make any other financial transaction. It is easier 
to spend the money received through remittances on other things.
If this second explanation is taken as a plausible one, the banks should reconsider the 
increase of cell phone penetration and take advantage of the capacity of the cell phones to 
provide mobile banking – which offers radically improved cost structures – rather than 
looking at other indicators such as fixed lines or income to decide whether or not serve 
the market.
Thirdly, having savings accounts in Mexico is expensive. The remainder between 
received remittances and consumption, i.e. the amount available for saving, has to be 
significant to make saving a lucrative option. Banks generally charge very high fees (for 
bank accounts) and give very little interest (for savings accounts).24 Additionally, there 
are very high minimum balance requirements in place. To sum up banks do not provide 
the right incentives to the population to have bank or savings accounts. Hence, people 
                                                
24 There exist exceptions to the rule such as BANORTE, which offers bank accounts at no charge to 
remittance receivers.
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may just decide to spend the entire money on consumption (which includes spending on 
cell phones). So the unattractive product offering of Mexican banks may disincentivize 
people to save, which explains the negative sign between cell phone users and savings 
accounts.
b. Summary of Empirical Results
The authors find a positive relationship between remittances and savings accounts and 
between remittances and cell phone users in the 32 Mexican states. Nonetheless, cell 
phone users cause less savings. The paper offers three explanations for the negative, 
causal relationship between cell phone users and savings:
1. Substitution effects between consumption (cell phone usage) and savings
2. Banks’ failure to take into account high cell phone penetration rates when 
calibrating their product mix for rural zones, which leads to inconvenient, 
inaccessible bank locations and ATMs; this in turn leads to higher preference for 
consumption (cell phone usage) than for savings.
3. The product mix offered by banks is not geared towards remittances receivers’
necessities – low interest rates for savings accounts, high fees for bank accounts 
and high minimum balance requirements make financial intermediation 
unattractive and leads to higher preference for consumption (cell phone usage).
10. Recommendations
Throughout the document we have shown that remittances represent an opportunity to 
serve as a vehicle for deeper bancarization, higher savings and welfare for the poor. The 
poor’s adoption of technology has provided new ways to reach those segments of the 
population that have always been excluded. Technological solutions that leverage the use 
of cell phones could be the missing link in the search for means through which 
remittances can help promote development. This is especially true in light of the deep 
inefficiencies in the financial services and the high costs that the poor face. Active 
policies should be instrumented to develop the mobile financial market. Policy makers 
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should pave the way for a transition that is required to make sure not to further entrench
the exploitation of the poor. 
We showed in our econometric study that remittances promote savings accounts, but at 
the same time have an ambiguous effect on them through increased cell phone 
penetration. By creating virtual mobile bank accounts banks can leverage the relatively 
high cell phone penetration across the income pyramid, to bank Mexico’s population –
while benefiting from additional profitable business. Given remittances’ savings 
increasing nature, starting with remittances’ recipients is the logical and most powerful
tipping point of the process.  
Our study finds that banks ignore the potential of the mobile banking market, including 
remittances transfers over cell phones. We suggest a number of policies to be 
implemented to enable the prospering of the mobile financial industry. The following 
paragraphs enlist the suggested policies.
a. Cost and Access
One of the main obstacles that impedes the bancarization of the poor in Mexico is the 
high cost of financial products such as bank accounts. The maintenance fee and the 
minimum requirements are very high for those in the bottom of the income pyramid. At 
the same time, the concept of saving accounts has almost disappeared for the poor for 
they have to have significant minimum balances to even receive meager interest rates. 
The financial authorities should work on encouraging the creation of financial 
instruments and credit, either by incentives or by regulation. Although not perfect, there 
are examples of incentive initiatives such as the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in 
the US. The CRA’s purpose is to “encourage depository institutions to help meet the 
credit needs of the communities in which they operate, including low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound banking operations”25. By 
                                                
25 For additional information, visit the Community Reinvestment Act webpage at: 
http://www.ffiec.gov/cra/history.htm
38
learning from the experience of those kinds of laws the Mexican authorities can improve 
access to credit.
b. Encouragement and Access for Non-Bank Financial Institutions
Currently, Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) are not allowed to access the Federal 
Reserve Automated Clearing House (FedACH) system for cheap transferal of funds. 
They have to conduct the transfer of remittances using banks as points of entry to the 
financial systems. Although the access to such a sophisticated system is delicate, the Fed 
and the Central Bank of Mexico could attempt to create an alternative channel of clearing 
house systems where MTOs could clear their international operations and reduce their 
costs by not having to pay banks high fees as intermediaries in the process. Although 
research is poor on the possible colluding behavior of banks, given their strong market 
power (recall from section 7 that the five largest banks hold 82% of all the deposits only 
in Mexico City where there is more competition), making them the main funnel for 
remittance transmissions can lead to collusion and higher prices.
Credit and loan cooperatives and credit unions are restricted from access to the 
mainstream financial clearinghouses as well as to the FedACH too. As mentioned above, 
recent governmental action has been taken with in cooperation with BANSEFI, one of the 
federal development banks. However, more development banks could participate in the 
process of providing access for Non-Bank Financial Institutions. Those banks may 
include BANCOMEXT and NAFINSA for instance. At the same time, the government 
could explore the possibility of using cell phone mechanisms for government assistance 
transfers such as Oportunidades.
c. Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency
Given the latest trends and international concerns with respect to terrorism financing and 
money laundering, Mexican authorities should push for a coordinated, international 
agenda – at least with the US (by virtue of being the country with which it conducts 
almost all its remittance operations) – to homogenize the regulation and disclosure of 
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compliance procedures in the transmission process of remittances. For many new MTOs 
regulations they need to abide by is confusing, increasing the barriers of entry and 
making remittances sending more costly, legal advice needs to be hired from the outset.
d. Clear Operational Frameworks for Credit and Loan Cooperatives
Loan cooperatives and microfinance institutions are organizations that have had a better 
grasp of the poor through their extensive coverage and dispersion. However, there is no
sufficiently comprehensive regulatory body in place. The Popular Savings and Credit 
Law to further improve transparency and security for customers – especially the ones at 
the bottom of the pyramid. In the past fraud was common, with dark consequences for the 
poor in rural areas. A recent initiative by the government in Mexico and BANSEFI, a 
national development bank, is taking the first steps in registering financial institutions 
and trying to provide regulatory frameworks for those institutions but more needs to be 
done. Especially, regulatory bodies should be forward looking and flexible to 
technological innovations in remittances transmission and other uses such as M-Banking
in general.
e. Improve Regulation to Reduce Monopolies in the 
Telecommunications Sector
High concentration in the telecommunications industry may be the single most important 
threat for the development of a widespread mobile banking market either for remittances 
as well as for simple points of sale systems. Legislation and enforcement regarding 
interconnection rights and their pricing need to be designed carefully in order to avoid 
monopolistic rents and foster competition. At the same time, rules must be clear to 
prevent mobile companies from developing controls on the access to Internet content 
through cell phones. 
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f. Incentives for ICT Investment 
Mexico compares unfavorably on its ICT investment levels against countries that have 
the same level of GDP. Therefore, ICT investments should be provided with incentives, 
especially considering that information technology on cell phones has the capacity to 
reach the poor and help close the financial gap for the poor. On the other hand 
investments should be encouraged to create more competition in the telecommunications 
sector. Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) need to be allowed to use the 
existing infrastructure of telecommunications companies to increase competition and 
efficiencies.
g. Efforts to Improve Financial Literacy 
The government and organizations should engage in creating programs to promote 
financial literacy for the poor. Recently, the Central Bank of Mexico inaugurated the 
Museum of Economics26 in Mexico City. Projects of similar nature could assist in 
educating the poor about financial services and their advantages.
                                                
26 Museo de Economía
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12. Appendix
The function for bank savings is assumed to be as:
 ,,,,,tan, populationratiopopulationbranchesincomecesremitcelusersfngsBankinsavi 
To take into account the heterogeneity of the data on size at state level, the series of the 
regression need to be expressed in logs, thus the functional form of the equation is: 





31
1
2
654
3210
)log(
)()log()log()log(
i
i
tii
ti
utrendDpopulationtiopopruralrabranches
sondiceingreremesascelusersountssavingsacc


Where:
According to Wooldridge (2002: 274) The fixed estimator is consistent and 
asymptotically normal under the three assumptions below:  
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However, if assumption 3 is violated the variance of the coefficients below will be an 
improper variance estimator:
1
1
'2 )')(ˆˆ(ˆ)ˆ(rˆva 

 XXXuuXA
N
i
iiiuFE

 (where uXY ii      is simply the equation for all periods)
This inefficiency may arise in case of heteroskedasticity but most importantly in case of 
autocorrelation. This however happens more frequently when T is large, which is not the 
case of our sample where T=5, but nonetheless we estimated the robust errors with: 
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to account for any autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity.
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Variable Definitions:
savingsaccounts: Number of accounts at time t in state i. Source: “Comision Nacional 
Bancaria y de Valores” (CNBV), National Banking and Securities Commission, data 
available through Asociacion de Banqueros de Mexico (ABM), Association of Mexican
Banks at: http://www.abm.org.mx/estadisticas/cn-cnbv.htm
celusers: State penetration (number of cell phone users per 100 inhabitants) at time 
t*state population at time t. Source: Comision Federal de Telecomunicaciones 
(COFETEL), Federal Commission of Telecommunications, data available at: 
http://www.cft.gob.mx/wb2/COFETEL/COFE_Densidad_de_Telefonia_Movil_por_Entid
ad_Feder 
remesas: This variable measures the amount of dollars (remittances) received by the 
Mexican state i at time t. Source: Banco de México (Banxico), Central Bank of Mexico, 
data available at: http://www.banxico.gob.mx/tipo/estadisticas/index.html
indiceingreso: Measure of income. Source: income state index used by the UNDP, data 
available at: http://saul.nueve.com.mx/estadisticas/index.html
branches: This is the number of bank branches in state i at time t. Source: “Comision 
Nacional Bancaria y de Valores” (CNBV), National Banking and Securities Commission,
data available through Asociación de Banqueros de Mexico (ABM), Mexican Bankers 
Association at: http://www.abm.org.mx/estadisticas/cn-cnbv.htm
popruralratio: Percentage of the population that is rural, this index was calculated taking 
the rural population and dividing it by the total population. Source: Instituto Nacional De 
Estadistica Geografia en Informatica (INEGI), National Institute of Statistics, Geography 
and Informatics. Data available through the UNDP at: 
http://saul.nueve.com.mx/estadisticas/index.html 
Di: Specific dummy for each state in Mexico
trend2: Time-trend variable in quadratic form.
population: Source: Instituto Nacional De Estadistica Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), 
National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics. Data available through the 
UNDP at: http://saul.nueve.com.mx/estadisticas/index.html
The regressions were run using data from 2000 to 2006 at a state level. However, the 
level of remittances per state was only available for the period 2003-2006 at the Central 
Bank of Mexico. For the years 2000 to 2002 we obtained the national level of remittances 
from the Central Bank. Thus, we could estimate the state level using the rates of growth 
of the national aggregate series doing a backward calculation proportional to the level of 
remittances in the following year in a particular state. 
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The pool of specifications tested is listed in section 9 of this paper. The chosen
specification was selected due to its highest flexibility and comprehensiveness. 
The complete results of the chosen specification are:
Table 6: Complete Output for Chosen Specification.
Linear regression Number of obs =     128
                                                     R-squared       =  0.83
Number of clusters (state) = 32               Root MSE        =  .73
Dependent Variable: logsavings,  Errors: Robust    
    Coefficient    Std. Err. t value  P>|t|   
logcelusers -2.92 0.51 -5.76 0.00 -3.95 -1.88
logremesas 9.53 1.64 5.81 0.00 6.19 12.88
trend2 -0.15 0.06 -2.29 0.03 -0.28 -0.02
logbranches 5.92 1.14 5.19 0.00 3.60 8.25
popruralratio 32.61 24.44 1.33 0.19 -17.24 82.45
ndicedeingreso 4.90 29.85 0.16 0.87 -55.99 65.79
population 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.81 0.00 0.00
State Dummy ZACATECAS -4.03 25.03 -0.16 0.87 -55.07 47.01
State Dummy YUCATAN 20.02 19.17 1.04 0.30 -19.07 59.11
State Dummy VERACRUZ -10.17 14.45 -0.70 0.49 -39.65 19.32
State Dummy TLAXCALA 17.24 20.63 0.84 0.41 -24.84 59.31
State Dummy TAMAULIPAS 14.64 13.76 1.06 0.30 -13.42 42.70
State Dummy TABASCO 12.54 21.85 0.57 0.57 -32.03 57.10
State Dummy SONORA 17.09 15.82 1.08 0.29 -15.17 49.35
State Dummy SINALOA 2.77 19.38 0.14 0.89 -36.75 42.29
State Dummy SAN LUIS POTOSI 0.47 20.16 0.02 0.98 -40.65 41.59
State Dummy QUINTANA ROO 28.27 17.79 1.59 0.12 -8.01 64.55
State Dummy QUERETARO 9.42 18.63 0.51 0.62 -28.57 47.41
State Dummy PUEBLA -9.75 16.81 -0.58 0.57 -44.03 24.52
State Dummy OAXACA -14.60 24.66 -0.59 0.56 -64.89 35.69
State Dummy NUEVO LEON 15.84 9.99 1.59 0.12 -4.53 36.22
State Dummy NAYARIT 8.61 22.36 0.39 0.70 -37.00 54.23
State Dummy MORELOS 10.04 17.21 0.58 0.56 -25.06 45.15
State Dummy MICHOACAN -18.04 19.44 -0.93 0.36 -57.68 21.60
State Dummy ESTADO DE MEXICO -10.29 8.42 -1.22 0.23 -27.46 6.89
State Dummy JALISCO 0.26 11.01 0.02 0.98 -22.19 22.71
State Dummy HIDALGO -6.32 21.92 -0.29 0.78 -51.03 38.40
State Dummy GUERRERO -14.18 20.74 -0.68 0.50 -56.48 28.12
State Dummy GUANAJUATO -8.14 14.45 -0.56 0.58 -37.62 21.33
State Dummy DURANGO 7.59 20.07 0.38 0.71 -33.35 48.53
State Dummy CHIHUAHUA 13.20 14.24 0.93 0.36 -15.84 42.24
State Dummy CHIAPAS -11.13 21.49 -0.52 0.61 -54.96 32.71
State Dummy COLIMA 23.46 18.39 1.28 0.21 -14.05 60.97
State Dummy COAHUILA */ 22.68 16.38 1.38 0.18 -10.72 56.08
State Dummy CAMPECHE 22.55 22.03 1.02 0.31 -22.39 67.49
State Dummy BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR 35.48 21.17 1.68 0.10 -7.69 78.66
State Dummy BAJA CALIFORNIA NORTE 21.08 13.76 1.53 0.14 -6.98 49.13
State Dummy AGUASCALIENTES 16.68 17.28 0.97 0.34 -18.57 51.92
Constant -59.40 34.25 -1.73 0.09 -129.25 10.46
  [95% Conf. Interval]
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The Granger procedure mentioned in section 9 was conducted running the regressions:
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Where Wald tests contrast:
For (1) 0...: 210  nBBBH  vs. 0...: 1 nA BBH , and,  
For (2) 0...: 210  nH   vs. 0...: 1 nAH 
The results of jointly significant F tests from the regressions below show that the 
causality runs from cell users to bank accounts.27
Dependent Variable logsavings logcelusers
logsavings (t-1) 0.577 0.204
(1.3) (0.66)
logsavings (t-2) -0.348 -0.187
(-0.78) (-0.6)
logcelusers  (t-1) 0.565 1.039
(0.73) (1.91)
logcelusers  (t-2) -0.131 -0.33
(-0.17) (-0.6)
Constant 5.87 4.313
(5.27)** (5.54)**
Observations 32 32
R-squared 0.72 0.87
Value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Specifications
Where:
Logsavings(t-1)= logsavings lagged one period
logsavings(t-2)= logsavings lagged two periods
logcelusers(t-1)=logcelusers lagged one period
logcelusers(t-2)= logcelusers lagged two periods
                                                
27
Results can also be tested following Hurlin and Baptiste (2003) where they propose a new methodology 
to conduct causality tests in Panel data by separating effects on homogenous non causality, homogenous 
causality, heterogeneous non causality and heterogeneous non causality.
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As shown also in section 9 the granger causality tests show that the causality runs only
from cell users to saving accounts and are not simultaneously determined.
Granger Causality Tests F-value P-value
H0: Savings accounts do not cause cell users 0.23 0.793
H0: Cell users do not cause savings accounts 6.04 0.006
Table 9: Precise Results for Granger Tests.
